“Publish Or Perish”

The military and academia share a commonality. Progress is based on established criteria. In academia, your contribution to knowledge by the publication of articles in academic journals is a standard criterion for career advancement. Logan Wilson, in his work “The Academic Man”, a 1942 treatise on the sociology of a profession, stressed that academic success is often tied to prestige and competition, and the pressure on academics to research to advance their careers is figuratively termed “publish or perish”. In the military, operational success is hinged on innovation and adaptation. Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian military general and theorist, corroborated it in his work “On War,” a great work on military strategy, published as a result of the Napoleonic Wars of the 18th century. He argued that “war is the continuation of policy with other means”. This is my argument in this article.

We are at war

We are at war. I do not wish to pre-empt any thoughts. I am only stating the obvious. Boko Haram/ISWAP in the North-east. Bandits, and then of course extremist organisations in the North-west. Farmer/herder clashes in the North-central. Minimised militancy in the South-south. The South-east is bedevilled with separatist agitations. The South-west is not left out of the equation with scores of multidimensional security challenges. It is our sheer size that makes it seem otherwise. We are precariously at a crossroads, and the Prussian military theory readily comes to mind. It underscores that “military actions should align with political objectives.” This is regarding the expectation of chaos and spontaneous adaptation in addressing evolving security threats. Canada has been considering this approach in recent times. It is studying Taliban-style combat methods to defend itself if the United States decides to attack the country. This is food for thought.

Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria

The Defence Industries Corporation (DICON) was established in 1964 with a vision to be “a leading force in indigenous defence manufacturing in Africa.” The 62 years between 1964 and 2026 represent several decades of transformation and innovation in our way of life. Conversely, DICON is still neck-deep in what it was originally established for. It has not innovated. We missed an opportunity. Very painful. There is no point crying over spilt milk. We must move quickly to recover lost ground. Certain factors worked against DICON’s operational efficiency. Policy somersault is like bread and butter in Nigeria. Successive government policies on developing our indigenous defence capabilities can be interrogated. We didn’t put our best foot forward. We basked in a conventional euphoria that was rapidly replaced in 2009 when the Boko Haram insurgents began their violent campaign.

We struggled and are still struggling with how to deal decisively with the Boko Haram insurgency. DICON should today be a sprawling military industrial complex developing indigenous defence strategies towards addressing our security challenges beyond manufacturing military hardware. We can be the undisputed lead country in subregional security if we get our acts right. This can only happen when political leaders resolve to be strategic in our defence policy direction. The list of defence ministers from 1999 also gives an idea about the lackadaisical commitment by successive administrations towards developing our indigenous defence capabilities. One name on the list was particularly ridiculous. I was agitated. It was an affront to good conscience. It takes several efforts to make progress, and takes a single effort to destroy what has been recorded. This is the story of DICON and the missed opportunities.

A military-industrial complex

In August 2024, the National Agency for Science and Engineering Infrastructure (NASENI) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Ministry of Defence and DICON towards advancing our military hardware production through the establishment of a Military Industrial Complex to serve as a “hub for the development, production, and maintenance of military equipment, ranging from small arms to advanced defence systems.” I have been studying this proposal. The aim and objectives remain unclear. I am nonetheless optimistic. I am eager to see what NASENI comes up with at the end of the day.

Structural functionalism

The principle of structural functionalism is a sociological concept that views “society as a complex system with interdependent parts working together to maintain stability.” In its application in our defence ecosystem, a lot comes into play. Security is everybody’s business. It is an aberration to assume that the security agencies are the alpha and omega in our defence efforts. The security agencies are a fragment in the ecosystem. For example, a government policy can heighten conflict in the country. When such a policy is interpreted along political, ethnic and religious lines, we know what to expect. This is not alien to us.

I have remained circumspect in my public ruminations on our efforts towards addressing the security challenges in the country. I am conversant with our defence capabilities, prospects and challenges. My take has been consistent along the line of structural functionalism, where the political and military leaderships are united in purpose and direction without mutual suspicion. It is a tough one. But it is not an impossible one. The realisation that unconventional wars are not won by bullets, tanks and fighter jets alone is the start point. The battleground has shifted to the hearts and minds. Politics is local. It starts and ends there. It is the same with warfare.

Who moved my cheese?

The book “Who Moved My Cheese?” by Spencer Johnson is a message about embracing change and adapting to new realities. Every day comes with its challenges. This is not abnormal. What would be abnormal is our refusal to adapt to these challenges. And indigenously. The Sahel region has become a free-for-all space for extremist groups, and the Niger Republic is the transit hub for these groups. The picture is grim, given that their means and methods are inherently asymmetric. The danger is when conventional defence capabilities are developed and deployed for unconventional war. The last time I checked, five states in the Northwest share borders with the Niger Republic. Similarly, in the North-east, Borno State shares a border with the Niger Republic. This is our reality. What is our defence strategy and model for tackling these non-state actors and their unconventional war tactics?

Non-state actors do what conventional armies do, and more. They are dynamic in their means and methods. They appear to be the better strategists because they have a clear goal of what they want to achieve and go all out for it. There are no sentiments or bickering. The ultimate goal is the focus, and why it appears they are successful in their enterprise. This is in contrast with the focus of constituted authorities for reasons too numerous to mention. It is a systemic thing. But for how long do we wish to thrive in deliberate ignorance? We will “perish if we don’t “publish.” This is not rocket science. We must learn from our military history. How did we get it right in the yesteryears and recognised by the United Nations as a military powerhouse in Africa? Who was responsible for who and what? These questions are begging for answers.

– Ocheja, PhD, is a military historian and alumnus of the Nigerian Defence Academy