Same-Faith Ticket: Court Never Ruled On Constitutionality, Says Lawyer

A legal practitioner and Robson Legal, Osigwe Ahmed Momoh, has said the court that dismissed his earlier challenge to the same-faith presidential ticket did not determine the constitutionality of the arrangement, but based its decision on the issue of legal standing.

Momoh, who raised the issue in a fresh legal argument, said what was subsequently reported as a “loss” was not a determination that a same-faith ticket was constitutional.

According to him, the court’s decision centred on locus standi, or whether the applicant had sufficient legal standing to bring the case.

He argued that the distinction is important because, in his view, the substantive constitutional question was not determined by the court.

Momoh said a candidate who directly participated in an election and was affected by its outcome could potentially have a stronger basis to raise the issue in an election petition.

He said such a petitioner would have a direct interest in the outcome, unlike an applicant whose standing had previously been challenged.

Explaining the basis of his argument, Momoh referred to Section 14 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which provides that Nigeria shall be a state based on the principles of democracy and social justice.

He argued that the provision requires democracy and social justice to be considered together, adding that the constitutional requirement for social justice raises questions about fairness in the distribution of political power and representation.

Momoh also cited Section 14(3), which provides that the composition of the Federal Government should reflect the federal character of Nigeria and avoid the predominance of persons from a few states or ethnic or other sectional groups.

He argued that the provision could raise questions concerning religious representation where both the President and Vice-President belong to the same faith.

He, however, acknowledged that the application of the provision to religious representation remains a matter for judicial interpretation.

Momoh further relied on Section 224 of the Constitution, which provides that the programme, aims and objectives of a political party shall conform with the provisions of Chapter II.

He said although Chapter II is generally regarded as non-justiciable, Section 224 creates a specific constitutional obligation for political parties.

According to him, this could provide a basis for examining whether the activities and choices of a political party conform with the principles contained in Chapter II.

Momoh maintained that the combined interpretation of Sections 14 and 224 raises constitutional questions about a same-faith presidential ticket.

He stressed that his argument is not that a court has already declared such a ticket unconstitutional, but that the substantive question, in his view, has not been conclusively determined.

On how the issue could be tested, Momoh said an election petition would provide a different legal setting because a candidate challenging an election would have a direct interest in the outcome.

He argued that if the constitutionality of a same-faith ticket were properly raised in such a petition, the tribunal or court could be required to consider the substantive constitutional arguments.

The eventual outcome, he said, would depend on the interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions, electoral laws and existing judicial precedents.

Momoh therefore maintained that the earlier dismissal of his case should not be interpreted as a judicial endorsement of the constitutionality of same-faith presidential tickets, since, according to him, the court did not determine the issue on its merits.