2027 And The Season Of Promises

By Ozumi Abdul

“E be like say they wan tell us another story again o…”

That familiar refrain from 2Baba’s “E Be Like Say” captures, perhaps unintentionally, one of the enduring features of Nigerian politics: the season of promises.

With the 2027 presidential election approaching, politicians across the political divide are again presenting Nigerians with competing visions of cheaper fuel, higher wages, more electricity, improved security, stronger institutions, better healthcare and a more productive economy.

The promises are coming from both established politicians and candidates seeking to break the dominance of the major political parties. But against the backdrop of previous campaign promises, economic hardship and the difficulty of translating political pledges into measurable results, a question increasingly confronts voters: how much of what politicians promise should Nigerians believe?

The answer may determine how the 2027 election is fought.

Former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar, the presidential candidate of the African Democratic Congress (ADC) , has placed the removal of petrol subsidy at the centre of his campaign argument.

Atiku has repeatedly promised to restore a form of fuel subsidy if elected president in 2027.

His position represents a significant departure from the direction taken by President Bola Tinubu, who announced the end of petrol subsidy during his inauguration on May 29, 2023. Atiku initially did not oppose subsidy removal, but he now argues that Nigerians have not seen sufficient benefits from the policy and that the savings have not translated into improved living conditions.

Atiku later clarified that what he envisages is not simply a return to the old import-dependent subsidy arrangement. His proposed model, according to his campaign, would be targeted, capped, transparently budgeted and independently audited, with greater emphasis on domestic refining and reducing energy costs.

He has also linked the proposal to broader economic measures, including increasing Nigerians’ purchasing power, supporting domestic production, reducing energy and transportation costs and improving economic and physical security.

His campaign has additionally promised an economic stimulus fund, stronger security measures, affordable housing, a job-led economy and lower governance costs. The ADC has separately promised to abolish opaque security votes and pursue a more opportunity-driven economy.

The political attraction of the subsidy promise is obvious. Petrol prices affect transportation, food distribution, small businesses and household expenses. But the policy question is equally obvious: how much will the proposed subsidy cost, how will it be funded and how will the corruption associated with previous subsidy regimes be prevented?

Those are questions voters will need answered before treating the promise as more than a campaign slogan.

Peter Obi, the presidential candidate of the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC) on his own has placed electricity at the centre of his economic programme.

Obi has promised to raise Nigeria’s electricity generation and distribution capacity to at least 10,000 megawatts within four years if elected president in 2027.

When announcing the target, he argued that Nigeria, with a population of more than 200 million people, cannot build a productive economy around an electricity system producing only a fraction of the power required by households and businesses.

The electricity proposal is part of a broader agenda focused on moving Nigeria from a consumption-driven economy to a production-driven one.

Obi has promised greater investment in education, healthcare, agriculture, manufacturing, technical and vocational education, infrastructure, human capital and job creation. His policy documents also emphasise strengthening security so that farmers can return safely to their farms, improving agricultural productivity and developing an environment where businesses can invest, expand and employ more people.

He has also argued that existing infrastructure should be repaired before the government embarks on unnecessary new projects. In his recent campaign engagements, he said existing schools and roads should be fixed rather than allowing infrastructure to deteriorate while new projects are announced.

Then came another promise that attracted considerable attention, particularly in northern Nigeria.

Obi said that if elected president, he would spend Sallah in Sokoto with the Sultan and use such occasions to bring Nigerians together for discussions about the country’s future. He also said a president should spend holidays within Nigeria and visit areas facing insecurity and other serious challenges.

The promise may sound symbolic, but Obi presented it as part of a broader philosophy of presidential engagement and national integration.

His challenge, like that of the other candidates, will be converting attractive targets into implementable programmes.

For example, taking Nigeria from the roughly 4,000MW range cited by Obi to 10,000MW would require substantially more than campaign rhetoric. It would require generation capacity, gas supply, transmission infrastructure, distribution investment, financing, maintenance and a regulatory framework capable of attracting private capital.

As for the Social Democratic Party (SDP) presidential candidate, Adewole Adebayo,he has gone even further on petrol pricing.

Adebayo has promised that petrol, cooking gas and aviation fuel, Jet A1, would sell for not more than N200 per litre within 12 months of his administration taking office.

He said the target would be achieved by rehabilitating Nigeria’s existing refineries, encouraging modular refineries and increasing domestic refining. He has also argued that the age of Nigeria’s refineries should not be used as an excuse for abandoning them, pointing to older refineries elsewhere that remain operational.

Adebayo’s manifesto goes beyond the N200 petrol pledge. He has promised four functional refineries and a massive expansion of electricity generation, with his manifesto putting a target of 75,000MW on generation.

His broader economic argument is that Nigeria should exploit its own crude oil resources and refining capacity rather than expose citizens to international fuel prices.

But again, the important question for voters is not only whether N200 sounds attractive. It is how the government would maintain that price when crude oil prices, exchange rates, refining costs, transportation costs and other market variables change.

Away from the trio, African Action Congress (AAC) presidential candidate Omoyele Sowore has offered perhaps the most dramatic wage proposal among the candidates so far.

Sowore has promised a N500,000 monthly living minimum wage for Nigerian workers if elected president.

He has linked the proposal to what he describes as a broader programme of “revolutionary justice and equal rights.” His agenda also includes 24-hour electricity, free education at all levels, one million public mixed-income homes, tenancy reforms, universal healthcare, industrialisation, expanded agriculture, infrastructure development and stronger security institutions.

Sowore has also proposed scrapping public examination fees, including WAEC and NECO fees, as part of his education programme.

The N500,000 proposal is particularly significant because Nigeria’s current wage debate has been dominated by the gap between workers’ incomes and the rising cost of living.

But a presidential campaign promise to pay N500,000 as a minimum wage immediately raises questions about inflation, productivity, government revenue, private-sector capacity, pension obligations and the ability of state governments and businesses to sustain such a wage.

In other words, the number is politically powerful. The financing plan will determine whether it is economically realistic.

This is where the words of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev are often invoked in discussions about political promises:

“Politicians are the same all over. They promise to build bridges even when there are no rivers.”

The quotation is widely attributed to Khrushchev and has become a popular political observation about promises that may have little relationship with practical realities.

The Nigerian experience gives the metaphor particular resonance.

Election periods are usually moments when politicians present voters with the most attractive version of the future. Roads will be built, electricity will improve, jobs will multiply, fuel will become cheaper, salaries will rise and insecurity will disappear.

The difficulty comes after the election, when campaign slogans meet budgets, bureaucracy, institutional weakness, competing interests, revenue limitations and political realities.

That is why the central issue for 2027 may not be which candidate has the most attractive promises.
It may be which candidate has the most credible pathway for fulfilling them.

That question is particularly relevant to President Bola Tinubu, who is seeking another term after making a major electricity promise during the 2023 campaign.

Tinubu told voters during the campaign that they would have electricity and would no longer pay “estimated bills.” He added that if he failed to keep the promise and returned for a second term, Nigerians should not vote for him unless he could provide adequate reasons for the failure.

The statement has now become politically significant because 2027 is approaching.

Tinubu’s administration has implemented major changes in the electricity market, including tariff reforms and the introduction of a sharper distinction between consumers based on the number of hours of electricity supplied.

But the experience of electricity consumers has also been defined by substantially higher tariffs for Band A customers.

In April 2024, NERC raised the Band A tariff from about N68 per kilowatt-hour to N225/kWh, an increase of more than 200 per cent. Band A customers were defined as consumers receiving a minimum of 20 hours of electricity per day. They represented roughly 15 per cent of the country’s 12 million electricity customers at the time.

The tariff was subsequently reduced to N206.80/kWh in May 2024 following changes in the exchange-rate component used in the tariff calculation.

By July 2025, an NERC tariff order for Ikeja Electric showed a Band A rate of N209.50/kWh, while Band B customers were on rates around N62.48/kWh for non-maximum-demand customers.

The important point is that the electricity market does not have one uniform national price.

NERC’s service-based tariff framework divides customers into five bands according to the minimum expected hours of supply:

Band A: at least 20 hours daily.

Band B: at least 16 hours.

Band C: at least 12 hours.

Band D: at least eight hours.

Band E: at least four hours.

Thus, Band A customers are expected to receive more electricity and pay a substantially higher tariff, while customers in lower bands receive fewer guaranteed hours and generally pay lower tariffs.

That distinction is central to the electricity debate because a higher tariff does not automatically mean a higher national electricity supply. It is a service-based pricing system intended to link payment to the quality of supply.

The numbers reveal the scale of the challenge facing whoever wins the presidency in 2027.

NERC’s April 2026 operational performance data showed that Nigeria had 13,625MW of installed grid-connected generation capacity, but only about 4,286MW was available for dispatch. The average load factor was 94 per cent, with about 4,048MW of available capacity actually utilised.

The figures expose one of Nigeria’s longstanding electricity problems.
Installed capacity is not the same as electricity actually available to consumers.

A power plant may exist on paper but be unavailable because of gas shortages, maintenance problems, equipment failure, transmission constraints, financing problems or other operational difficulties.

This distinction is crucial when candidates announce targets such as 10,000MW, 24-hour electricity or 75,000MW.

The real test is not simply how much generation capacity exists.
It is how much power can be generated, transmitted and distributed reliably to homes and businesses.

This is where the competing campaign promises become particularly interesting.
Peter Obi has promised at least 10,000MW of generation and distribution capacity within four years.

Sowore has promised 24-hour electricity. Adebayo’s SDP manifesto goes considerably further, targeting 75,000MW.

These figures should force Nigerians to ask a basic question: where will the additional power come from and what infrastructure will carry it?

Nigeria’s April 2026 figures show that the country had 13,625MW installed but only 4,286MW available for dispatch.

That gap suggests that the problem is not merely the construction of new power plants.

Nigeria must also solve gas supply, transmission bottlenecks, distribution losses, equipment failures, electricity market debts, metering, investment and the financial sustainability of the sector.

A presidential candidate who promises more electricity without explaining these interconnected problems is offering voters a target.

A candidate who explains how the target will be financed and delivered is offering a plan. There is a significant difference. This is where the 2027 election may differ from previous contests.

Nigerians have heard ambitious promises before. Some have been fulfilled partially, others have been modified and some have failed to materialise at the promised scale.

The result is a growing demand for evidence. Rather than simply asking whether Atiku will restore the subsidy, voters can ask how much it will cost.

Rather than asking whether Obi can produce 10,000MW, they can ask how many megawatts will be generated, transmitted and distributed.

Rather than simply celebrating Adebayo’s N200 petrol promise, voters can ask how the government will keep the price at N200 when market conditions change.

And rather than reacting to Sowore’s N500,000 wage proposal, voters can ask how many workers will be covered, what the annual wage bill will be and how governments and private employers will finance it without triggering another inflationary cycle.

These questions do not amount to opposition to any candidate. They are the basic questions of democratic accountability.

Professor Jimoh Ibrahim of the Department of Mass Communication, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, argues that campaign promises are a normal feature of election periods, but that Nigerian voters have become increasingly sceptical of them.

Ibrahim is listed by Ahmadu Bello University as a member of the Department of Mass Communication, with publications in communication and media studies.

According to the comment supplied for this article, Ibrahim said such promises should be expected during elections because candidates must communicate what they intend to do if given power.

However, he argued that Nigerians no longer take political promises as seriously as they once did.
If that assessment is correct, the implication is important for the 2027 contest: simply making a dramatic promise may no longer be enough to secure an electoral advantage.

The electorate may increasingly want evidence, numbers, timelines and implementation strategies.
That may ultimately be the real lesson of 2027.Nigeria does not lack presidential promises.

What the country has struggled with is the conversion of promises into measurable improvements in the lives of citizens.

Fuel subsidy is a good example. Atiku is promising its return in a modified form because millions of Nigerians associate its removal with higher living costs.

Electricity provides another example. Obi is promising 10,000MW, Adebayo is promising 75,000MW, while Sowore is promising 24-hour electricity.

But Nigeria’s power system already demonstrates why targets alone are insufficient: the country had 13,625MW of installed grid-connected capacity in April 2026 but only 4,286MW available for dispatch.

The difference between installed capacity and usable power is a metaphor for Nigerian governance itself.

There are policies on paper.

There are budgets.

There are projects.

There are campaign promises.

But what matters to citizens is what finally reaches them.

For the voter in a rural community, that means whether the farm is safe, the road is passable, electricity is available and the price of food is affordable.

For the trader, it means whether electricity and transportation costs allow the business to survive.

For the civil servant, it means whether salary can buy enough food, pay rent and support a family.

For the student, it means whether education provides a realistic route to employment.

And for the entire country, it means whether the government can turn Nigeria’s enormous human and natural resources into a better quality of life.

That is why the 2027 election should not only be a competition of promises.

It should be a competition of cost plans, records, timelines, evidence and accountability.

2Baba’s “E Be Like Say” may have been written as a musical reflection on the recurring stories Nigerians hear from those in power. But as another election approaches, its central sentiment remains remarkably relevant.

E be like say dem wan tell us another story again. The question Nigerians must ask in 2027 is simple:

What is the story, what will it cost, how will it be done, and what evidence do we have that this time it will be different?

Ozumi is an investigative journalist, Fact-checker and editor. He can be reached via [email protected]