Nigeria’s Security Challenges Politicised, Core Issues Neglected –Adamu

With banditry and mass kidnappings rising again across multiple states, even under sustained security operations, what do you think is driving this dangerous resurgence?

The truth is that very little has been done to address the underlying factors driving insecurity. These root causes include socio-economic deprivation, poverty, unemployment, lack of access to education, and general backwardness, all the socio-cultural conditions that have fueled insecurity for years. Unfortunately, both federal and state governments have not taken sufficient action. If you examine the northern states where these challenges are most severe, they also record the highest poverty levels in the country. In fact, data shows that Nigeria remains the world’s poverty capital. It used to be India and China, but Nigeria has overtaken them despite their much larger populations. That’s the first issue.

The second factor is the political climate. Insecurity has become politicised, especially with the 2027 elections approaching. We believe some individuals are deliberately instigating violence to deploy it as a political tool. At the same time, ruling parties, at both federal and state levels often avoid confronting certain security challenges when doing so is not politically convenient. For instance, if influential figures within communities, whether religious, ethnic, or even business leaders are implicated in security issues, politicians may hesitate to act against them for fear of losing electoral support. This cuts across all political parties; I am not singling out any one of them.

Third are environmental factors. We have not effectively mitigated climate change or its consequences. Flooding displaces communities and increases pressure on land, forcing people to move in ways that trigger conflict. Our response to environmental challenges has been weak. Corruption also plays a role here. Climate intervention funds, the Ecological Fund, and other resources meant to address environmental issues are often mismanaged. Coupled with poor land-governance policies across states, exclusion and inequity continue to heighten tensions. Many of our forests lack government presence entirely, allowing armed non-state actors to occupy these spaces and perpetrate crimes.
Beyond these structural issues are specific security-related factors. First is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Although a Centre for Small Arms and Light Weapons exists, little progress has been made in curbing the availability of weapons. We now see criminals wielding more sophisticated arms; including Israeli-made weapons and even using drones.

Second is their ability to recruit. Because socio-economic conditions remain poor, these groups continue to attract new members with ease. Third is their capacity to generate funding. We have not disrupted the financial networks that sustain them. Finally, their mobility remains largely unhindered. Many of them move easily by motorbike, and not enough has been done to restrict this.

There may also be geopolitical dimensions. Recent statements by the President of the United States widened the religious divide between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. Even if the remarks were not intended to incite violence, they created tensions that armed groups are now exploiting. This widening gap provides them with an opportunity to intensify their attacks.

Given the socio-economic, political, and environmental challenges you’ve highlighted, would you say our security agencies are overstretched and struggling to cope? If so, what urgent reforms or support systems are needed to enhance their effectiveness?

They are overstretched, but it’s more than just that. Their ability to operate effectively at once is limited. To put it in perspective, I’ll use the term “national security enterprise,” which includes the organisations, laws, policies, and both local and international partnerships necessary to address insecurity.
If we look at the organisations alone, there are about 29 primary ones; the army, intelligence services, paramilitary, and others. On top of that, there are about 14 associated agencies, such as the ICPC, EFCC, NFIU, among others. So the challenge isn’t simply understaffing; we already have around 42 organisations involved. The real issue is that they are not working together simultaneously.

Coordination is weak. Ideally, the Office of the National Security Adviser, Ministers of Defence, Interior, Police Affairs, and Justice should meet to create a unified action plan that ensures collaboration across all 42 agencies. If that happened, and if we incorporated technology effectively, the overstretch argument would largely disappear.

Modern security relies on three key elements: humans, technology, and systems. If these were applied across all agencies in a coordinated manner, we would not see the fragmentation we have today. Instead, the military ends up carrying the bulk of responsibility for nearly every security challenge, even those that fall squarely under other agencies. For example, border security is formally the responsibility of immigration, customs, the National Boundary Commission, NAPTIP, and other relevant bodies, but in practice, everyone looks to the military.

Because of this misalignment, the military faces undue pressure while other organisations often operate without the same accountability. Until this structural issue is addressed, it’s misleading to simply say security agencies are overstretched.

Take the National Security Council as an example. It is supposed to meet at least quarterly to coordinate all security efforts. Under this administration, it has only met once. Without proper coordination, clear mandates, and accountability across all agencies, the system is bound to be inefficient, and the overstretch perceived in the military will continue.

Given the coordination challenges and overstretch in our current security system, do you think Nigeria is now ready for a full transition to state policing? If so, what safeguards should be in place to prevent political misuse?

In reality, we already have elements of state policing in Nigeria. There is no community without some level of policing carried out by its own structures, and no state without similar arrangements. What hasn’t happened is a constitutional review to formally allow it.

Politically, consensus seems to be growing. Southern governors have expressed support, the president has endorsed it, and even northern governors have come on board. So the political alignment is largely there. What remains is for the National Assembly to amend Section 214 of the Constitution, which currently recognises only the federal policing structure, to accommodate sub-national policing. By sub-national, I mean not just state-level policing, but also local government policing.

Regarding safeguards, these are absolutely necessary. For instance, just as we have the Police Service Commission at the federal level, there should be similar commissions at the state and local government levels to act as independent watchdogs.

Appointment of police leadership must also be protected from executive interference. The governor should not have sole authority over appointing the commissioner of Police at the state level, or equivalent positions at the local level. One option could be an elected position, similar to some U.S. models, where qualified candidates contest for the role. Another option is a committee of eminent judicial members at the state level, headed by the state Attorney General, which nominates a candidate for confirmation by the state assembly. This would greatly reduce political manipulation and undue influence by the executive.

Additionally, there should be strict rules of engagement and operational guidelines so that all three arms of state government can exercise oversight. This would limit abuse and ensure accountability.
Finally, for state policing to truly work, democratic traditions at the state level must be strengthened. Currently, with governors wielding disproportionate power and state assemblies often subservient, such a system would fail. Just as we advocate for strengthened democratic norms at the federal level, we must do the same at the state level. Only then can state policing be implemented effectively and fairly.

With police withdrawn from VIP protection, many officials have expressed feeling vulnerable. Is this the right move, and what impact could it have on their security and public safety?
The presidential statement on withdrawing police from VIP protection is somewhat vague and requires clarification. From our understanding, police assigned to VIPs are actually a small fraction of those on protective duties. The larger group is deployed to commercial organisations, banks, oil companies, and similar entities. The presidential statement does not address this component.
Not too long ago, an EU Commission report on asylum estimated that there are up to 100,000 officers in these roles. The Inspector-General, however, stated that only 11,000 are on VIP protective duties and that he has recalled them. That may be correct, but nothing has been done regarding officers protecting commercial organisations.
If VIPs now feel vulnerable, I would argue that it mirrors the vulnerability the average Nigerian experiences daily. Perhaps feeling that vulnerability will encourage political leaders to take meaningful action on security, because under the special contracts, they are the ones responsible for ensuring protection, and historically, they have not done so.
However, constitutionally, certain political appointees are entitled to VIP protection. We should maintain protection for the president, vice president, and some key appointees.
Another important point is skills. Many officers on protective duties have either lost essential policing skills due to long-term VIP assignments or may never have had them. It is crucial that now, with the withdrawal of the 11,000 officers, the IG engages them in comprehensive training to restore and maintain their policing capabilities before redeploying them for general duties.
Finally, the presidency needs to clarify the status of officers still assigned to commercial organisations. Without this clarity, it will be difficult to assess the real impact of the policy and ensure accountability.

Based on your research, are any parts of the country effectively controlled by non-state actors, despite government denials?
Is there any part of this country under the control? You know the word control is relative. Do we have non-state actors present in locations in Nigeria? Yes. Do we have them governing in terms of administration where they have structures to administer? I don’t think so.
You can have instances where because of their presence they are collecting taxes, collecting dues, and even sometimes administering or sometimes even administering some services like health. But for them to have structures where they govern, no, I’m not aware of that. There are different actors across the country, and each of them has their objectives.
So you have the ideological non-state groups like the Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad like the Islamic State in West Africa, Provincial Al-Akwarawas and all of that. They have relative dominance in certain locations, but they don’t have structures for governing. They used to have before 2016, but I think it’s their own strategy not to govern territory at the moment.The bandits also have control in several parts of northwest and north central, but they don’t govern. They don’t have administrative structures for governing.

The Safe School Initiative has been ongoing for some time, with a total budget of about $144.77 billion from 2023 to 2026. Yet attacks on schools continue. What is your position on the initiative, and what do you think is going wrong despite this level of investment?
Honestly, I think the desk responsible for managing the Safe School Initiative in the Ministry of Finance should, if not arrested, at least be thoroughly audited. Huge sums of money have been released, yet we haven’t seen meaningful progress. Where malfeasance or corruption is discovered, those responsible should be held accountable.
As for whether schools are truly fortified against these attacks—not at all. Take Chibok in 2014: the Safe School Initiative was introduced in response to that tragedy. Since then, billions have been allocated, including the $144.77 billion over the past three to four years. Yet here we are, 11 years later in 2025, and schools are still being raided, and students abducted. Clearly, the objectives of the initiative have not been met, despite these massive investments.