Parties’ Deregistration Is Encroachment On INEC’s Constitutional Autonomy -Ubani

Human rights lawyer, Dr Monday Ubani (SAN), has described the judgment of the Federal High Court in Abuja ordering the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to deregister five political parties as a potentially troubling encroachment on the constitutional autonomy of the Commission.

Ubani, who raised significant constitutional and legal concerns over the judgment delivered by Justice Peter Lifu, insisted that the case raises unresolved questions concerning locus standi, judicial authority, and the constitutional powers granted to INEC.

The lawyer noted that the action was not filed under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules and was not based on any constitutional or statutory provision that would expand the claimants’ locus standi.

He further maintained that Nigerian courts have traditionally adopted a restrictive approach to locus standi except in clearly defined constitutional situations.

Ubani, a former Chairman of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) Ikeja branch, contended that the issue of standing should have been carefully examined before the court considered the case’s substantive merits.

He also expressed concern over what he described as a potentially blurred line between judicial oversight and institutional independence.

The lawyer emphasised that INEC is a constitutionally established independent body tasked with specific electoral responsibilities, and courts have historically exercised caution when directing how such discretion should be exercised.

The legal expert argued that the judgment appears to assume that once conditions outlined in Section 225A of the Constitution are alleged to have been satisfied, INEC is immediately obliged to deregister affected political parties.

Ubani warned that such an interpretation might undermine the distinction between constitutional authority, administrative decision-making, and judicial enforcement.

He further noted that there is ongoing debate about whether some of the parties targeted for deregistration are truly in breach of constitutional requirements.

If such doubt exists, he stated, the initial assessment should be carried out by INEC, the institution constitutionally charged with making that determination.

Referencing previous Supreme Court decisions, including NUP v. INEC and related appeals, Ubani maintained that while the apex court affirmed INEC’s constitutional power to deregister political parties, it did not necessarily turn that power into an automatically enforceable duty that any interested party could compel through litigation.

He identified three key issues requiring clarification by appellate courts: whether Section 225A creates a self-executing mandatory duty or one reliant on INEC’s assessment; whether the claimants had the legal standing to initiate the action; and whether the court’s order represented an improper substitution of administrative discretion.

Ubani concluded that although the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional framework for party deregistration critical questions about standing, judicial intervention, and the limits of court authority over INEC’s constitutional functions remain unresolved.

He called for further legal and academic engagement on the matter, warning that increasing judicial interference in political affairs could constrict democratic space and urging appellate courts to define the constitutional boundaries between electoral regulation, administrative discretion, and judicial oversight.